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Abstract 
In the early 70’s, scientists debated hotly the provoking claims that Meadows and 
his co-authors put forward in their book ‘Limits to Growth’ and which they based 
on computer simulation runs. This lively debate is reconsidered to flesh out two 
more general aspects of scientific computer simulation. The first point deals with 
the question where simulation scientists locate the agency in the activity of com-
puter simulation: Is it the assumptions made by humans or is it the calculations 
done by the machine that are to be held responsible for the simulation results? The 
second aspect hints to the problem of how much data are necessary to make a 
computer simulation a true and meaningful representation of reality. In the case of 
the debate over Limits to Growth these two questions were answered differently by 
the proponents and the critics of the simulation study. Whereas many scientific 
controversies involve scientists who have done research which has lead them to 
diverging conclusions about the same matter, the debate over Limits to Growth dif-
fered in this respect. It can be construed more adequately as the repulsion of re-
searchers who tried to intrude social scientific expertise with the help of computer 
simulation. This is why computer simulation became one of the key issues in this 
scientific debate. 
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1 Introduction 
In 1972 Dennis Meadows and his collaborators published ‘Limits to Growth’ in 
which they argue that several pressing global issues endanger the survival of hu-
mankind in the 21st century. The conclusions drawn in Limits to Growth were de-
rived from simulations run with a model called WORLD3. It was constructed dur-
ing a two-year long project, based at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) and financed by the Volkswagen foundation. The book and its strong state-
ments about the future were hotly debated in both, public and scientific media in 
the 70’s. It was also a topic for sociologists who proffered analyses of the simula-
tion study showing what actors came together to bring it about and what social fac-
tors influenced the results. Golub and Townsend (1977) argue that multinational 
companies, Sandbach (1978) that the environmentalist movement, and Bloomfield 
(1985) that the organizational context of the study can be held responsible for the 
results found in the simulation runs.  
 Figure 1: Number of scientific publications per year that cite the Limits to Growth study2 
Today, discussions about Limits to Growth have mostly petered out (see  Figure 
1), even though the sequel, ‘Beyond the Limits’ (Meadows et al. 1992), has led to 
a slight increase in received attention. Sociological observers have had their say 
about how Limits to Growth was possible, and recently Elichirigoity (1999) pub-
lished a comprehensive and detailed history of the project. Why is it useful to con-
tinue to dwell on the past and examine the scientific controversy over Limits to 
Growth? I think there are two reasons why one should reconsider this case:  
First, only fairly recently have science and technology studies become aware of 
the wide use of computer simulation in the production of scientific knowledge. For 
many years the specific problems and potentials that accompany computer simula-
tion have been largely overlooked. From an analytical point of view it is not suffi-
cient to say that simulation is similar to experimenting or similar to theorizing. To 
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do so would be dangerous since these distinctions form a discursive resource for 
those who engage in computer simulation (Dowling 1999). Instead, it is necessary 
to take comparisons of simulation to either experiment or theory as the explanan-
dum. The specific characteristics of computer simulation in scientific practice and 
discourse are being fleshed out in something one could aptly call ‘social studies of 
scientific computer simulation’3. Limits to Growth is an ideal case to contribute to 
such an endeavor because computer simulation featured prominently in it, and the 
controversy around it attracted a lot of attention from laypersons as well as experts. 
Second, if one takes a closer look at the sociological studies that already exist 
regarding the scientific controversy over Limits to Growth one finds that they are 
biased against the simulation-study. Some employ the same strategy as those who 
attacked the results of the simulation: They present its results as caused not by sci-
entific reasoning, but by some overwhelming Zeitgeist, like a general feeling of 
anxiety, the trend of globalization in the business world, or the environmental 
movement4. Even when it is taken into account that social factors are present not 
only in the case of the production of Limits to Growth but also in the production of 
the counter-arguments, one gets the impression that sociological reflections aim to 
denigrate the Limits to Growth-study5. If the Zeitgeist or other social factors are the 
accepted causes for ‘unvalidated’, ‘confusing’, and ‘demoralizing’ simulation re-
sults there is no space left for the computer simulation to play an active role in the 
production of scientific knowledge6. Therefore the assumption that social factors 
can be made responsible for the flawed results of the Limits to Growth-study need 
to be left behind, if one is interested in the phenomenon of scientific simulation.  
The examination to follow tries to attend closely to what is known in the sociol-
ogy of scientific knowledge as ‘symmetry’7: It will not picture the simulation study 
as erroneous or arrogant and it will not try to explain the misguided research as 
caused by something social. Rather, the positions of the Limits to Growth-
researchers and their critics will be discussed side by side. The goal here is to 
make visible the form of the debate and how it is arranged around two lines of con-
flict concerning computer modeling. These lines separate discussants as they give 
diverging answers to the two questions: (I) Who is the agent: modeler or model? 
(II) How much data does a valid model need? Thereby giving computer simulation 
a central role to play in the scientific controversy. Answers to both questions can 
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  The volumes edited by Morgan and Morrison (1999) and Sismondo (1999) include studies 
that make a step toward this direction. 
4
  Hagen (1972: 15), as well as Golub and Townsend (1977) and Sandbach (1978) follow this 
pattern of explanation. 
5
  This includes the technically very detailed study by Bloomfield (1985), that contrasts the si-
mulation study of the rigidly regulated, male dominated, and élitist MIT-group with the re-
laxed and egalitarian research group at Sussex. 
6
  Kusch (1991, part I) gives a short overview of various attempts to rid historical accounts of 
such totalizing explanations in favor of more flexible and sensitive vocabularies. 
7
  This concept was, of course, first introduced by Bloor (1976). 
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only be given by going back to the original sources, i.e. the scientific articles where 
the controversy took shape. Arguments will be presented in the terms of those who 
were involved in the debate. In contrast to how controversies are pictured usually 
in the sociology of science, the interpretation of these positions will suggest an un-
derstanding of the debate as a repulsion, as one among other possible reactions to 
an intrusion into a field of scientific expertise. 
2 Who is the agent: modeler or model? 
Sociological studies of technology struggle with the phenomenon that not only 
sense-making human subjects but also human-made mechanistic objects participate 
in chains of action8. Whereas sociology usually relies on coordinated interaction or 
communication of human actors as its matter of interest, studies of technology have 
to acknowledge that certain procedures of action can be put into manufactured 
things that perform as subject-free entities. In the case of the production of soft-
ware - a specific kind of technology - such transcribing rules for performing effec-
tive action into an artifact is signified by the word ‘coding’. By writing computer 
code does the programmer transcribe a certain program of action into the com-
puter. 
In a study situated in an engineering context, Downey (1998: 150f) describes the 
immediate factuality of such a transcription of performative competence that is 
called coding by engineers. He reports about Dr. Jayaram who had written a 
lengthy computer program to provide an intended functionality. After several years, 
when Jayaram had changed his work place, other programmers found it impossible 
to understand the code he had written. Turning to Jayaram for help they got the 
answer that even he, as the author of the program, did not know anymore how ex-
actly it works. All involved humans, well-trained programmers and the original au-
thor of the computer program in question, did not have the understanding necessary 
to change and elaborate the running computer code. Jayaram, the programmer, had 
inscribed the ability to perform certain tasks into a computer program. The program 
continued to perform and to provide the desired functionality. However, it was not 
fully clear to the author and other professional programmers how the program 
achieved that. This transcription of performative competence begs the question of 
who it is that produces effects: the programmer - a human subject - or the program 
- a manufactured object. That issue arises not only for students of technology but 
also for the technologically interested scientists. 
The situation is similar in the case of scientific computer simulation9. Research-
ers – not only sociologists of science interpreting their work – discuss who effects 
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  The most influential explications of this point have been made by the protagonists of Actor-
Network-Theory, e.g. Callon (1986) or Latour (1988b). 
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 The similarity between coding a functional piece of software and programming a computer 
simulation is also accompanied by dissimilarities. One lies in the fact that the engineer 
Jayaram could joke about his ignorance of how the code that he had written actually func-
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the results that come out of running a computer model. Is it the programming scien-
tist or the code-processing computer? In what follows, I show how conflicting po-
sitions were developed in the context of the Limits to Growth-study: 
What Limits to Growth-researchers 
write: 
”At the moment, our only alternatives to a 
model like this, based on partial knowledge, 
are mental models, based on the mixture of 
incomplete information and intuition that cur-
rently lies behind most political decisions. A 
dynamic model deals with the same incomplete 
information available to an intuitive model, but 
it allows the organization of information from 
many different sources into a feedback loop 
structure that can be exactly analyzed. Once all 
the assumptions are together and written 
down, they can be exposed to criticism” 
(129f)10 
Although they share the problem of 
incomplete information, there is a cru-
cial difference between mental and 
computer models: A mental model relies 
on the researcher’s intuition. A com-
puter processes only the explicit input 
given by the programmer – in this case 
in the form of a ‘system’ of ‘feedback 
loops’. The computer forces the mod-
eler to construct an explicit model that 
is visible to and therefore criticizable by 
other researchers. 
There is another reason why com-
puter models are valuable: 
”The human brain, remarkable as it is, can only 
keep track of a limited number of the compli-
cated, simultaneous interactions that determine 
the nature of the real world. ... [We have used] 
a formal, written model of the world. It consti-
tutes a preliminary attempt to improve our 
What critics write: 
”The Sussex team points out that the apparent 
detached neutrality of a computer model is as 
illusory as it is persuasive; … a computer mo-
del is only a mental model in more sophisti-
cated guise” (Streatfield 1973: 210) 
”This pessimistic [Malthusian] attitude has 
nothing to do with any modelling technique, 
but rather underlines a basic philosophy which 
the Sussex authors see as the major limitation 
of the Meadows approach.” (Streatfield 1973: 
211) 
The differences between mental and 
computer models are not as fundamental 
as it appears. A computer model is just 
an extended mental model, and is there-
fore subject to the same fallacies. This 
is obvious in the pessimistic attitude 
that underlies the model that was devel-
oped by Meadows and his colleagues. 
This begs the question as to how bi-
ased judgements can be implemented in 
a machine that performs mathematical –
 and thereby presumably unbiased – 
calculations: 
”It is sometime [sic] implied in discussions of 
the analysis presented in The Limits to Growth 
that the results are obtained by making the 
same assumptions about the world that other 
analysts make, but combining them in a com-
puter-aided system. Systems analysis, it is 
suggested, is the superior method that yields 
the result. I do not find this assertion explicit 
in the book itself. It is incorrect. The assump-
tions of their model are not the assumptions 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
tioned. In contrast, it is of utmost importance that the simulation scientist who wants to draw 
justifiable conclusions from simulation runs understands the details of the computer programs 
in use. This is exemplified by Evans (1997: 403f) who reports about a crisis that was caused 
by the unexpected and unexplained behavior of a computer model. It made researchers work 
frantically to find out why a change of allegedly no relevance in the model led to a substantive 
change in the simulation results. The crisis was overcome as soon as the researchers under-
stood what in the simulation had caused the change. 
10
  Quotes that do not give any further information about authors and year of publication always 
refer to the original publication of The Limits to Growth by Meadows et al. (1972). 
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mental models of long-term, global problems 
by combining the large amount of information 
that is already in human minds and in written 
records with the new information-processing 
tools that mankind’s increasing knowledge has 
produced - the scientific method, systems 
analysis, and the modern computer” (26) 
The computer model draws together 
the available information that people 
already possess and allows the modeler 
to explore the resulting implications. 
Integrating and processing the informa-
tion in one large model is not a feasible 
task for the human mind. The computer 
however, can perform such information 
processing in an exact way using a large 
amount of information. 
Summary: 
Computer simulation results gain 
their credibility from combining (a) the 
explicit construction of the model and 
(b) the scope and precision of the calcu-
lations. In contrast to human reasoning 
the computer yields results that are eas-
ier to verify and more precise. 
that other analysts make. They are peculiarly 
unrealistic ones. … 
Indeed, given these assumptions, any intelli-
gent person would conclude in a minute that 
the system would end in catastrophe. … No 
computer-aided analysis or any other elaborate 
analysis is necessary.” (Hagen 1972: 12) 
The key to uncovering the biased 
character of the results of the computer 
simulation is realizing that the assump-
tions in constructing the model are not 
the standard assumptions of economics. 
On the contrary, the assumptions made 
by Meadows and his colleagues are 
chosen so that the results necessarily 
follow. The simulation runs do not add 
any insight that could not have been de-
rived from the assumptions by mental 
powers alone. 
Summary: 
The results presented in Limits to 
Growth are due to the assumptions 
made by the researchers. From these 
assumptions the conclusions can be de-
rived in a straightforward manner. 
Therefore, the use of the computer 
model is superfluous and misleading. 
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Most contributions to the Limits to Growth-debate take the simulation as consisting 
of two parts: Human modelers make assumptions that define the model and specify 
initial and boundary conditions. The computer merely derives the implications of the 
model under the chosen circumstances. This separation of modeler and model is the 
basis of the experimental character of computer simulation. If the model were fully de-
pendent on the modeler it would not be possible to replicate the simulation runs with 
that computer model (Evans 1997: 408). The autonomy of the computer model is what 
enables scientists to gain insights from exploring the space they construct in the model-
ing procedure. In this sense, computer simulation is experimental: it provides con-
trolled surprise (Dowling 1999: 264f). Simulation scientists work on implementing the 
model in computer code. They fiddle around with the machine so that it becomes pos-
sible to scan systematically through the parameter space. After the scientists set up the 
computational model and all necessary variables, the computer takes over and deter-
mines the model’s response to the specified parameter settings. While the computer 
does its work, the modeler can (only) watch to see what happens. The excerpts above 
show that even if this distinction between the model and the modeler, and the unbiased 
character of the computational operations, is taken for granted, there can be disagree-
ment about what part of the simulation is to be held responsible for the simulation re-
sults. 
The modelers take their assumptions to be essentially self-evident and consensual. 
According to them, the results of the simulation are due to the precise and complex 
computations executed by a machine that outperforms the human mind when it comes 
to calculating the evolution of a large number of interdependent variables over a long 
period of time. The modelers stress that without the possibility of performing a large 
number of computations in an exact way, the results could not have been found. There-
fore, the computer model is regarded as the crucial agent leading to the conclusions of 
the book. 
Those who oppose the simulation results claim that the assumptions made by the 
modelers were such that the expected results followed readily without much computa-
tional effort. In their view, the computer is only a humble servant to the modelers, turn-
ing the biased assumptions into computationally, i.e. apparently objectively derived, 
results. The computer model adds neither reliability nor quality to the results. There-
fore, it is the modelers that are to be held responsible for the derived conclusions. 
It should be mentioned that this conflict over who is responsible for simulation re-
sults, the modelers who make the underlying assumptions or the model that does the 
calculations, is not an old-fashioned, superseded one that was only relevant in the very 
early days of computer modeling. It was equally visible in the controversy over the 
explanation of scientific knowledge between sociologists and cognitive scientists in the 
late eighties (Slezak et al. 1989). Such a difference in locating the agency in the com-
puter modeling can show up in all cases where computers are used to furnish scientific 
insights. This is true for conflicts between scientists who support computer simulation 
and scientists who oppose to computer simulation as a helpful method for scientific 
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work. It can also be relevant for different strategies that are used within the computer 
modeling community itself (Evans 1997). 
There was a second line of conflict in the debate over Limits to Growth, which 
made critics doubt the believability of the results of the simulation study. It developed 
around the question whether the amount of empirical data invested in the model was 
sufficient or deficient. In the next section I turn to discussions about this issue. 
3 How much data does a valid model need? 
WORLD2, an earlier version of WORLD3, was the last of a series of systemic, dy-
namic models that Jay Forrester developed (1971). It is the application of a general 
analytic approach11, called ‘system dynamics’, to yet another domain: first a business, 
then a city, and now the world12. The experience he gained from developing these ear-
lier models allowed Forrester to make a rough sketch of a model of the world on a 
plane returning to the US from a meeting of the Club of Rome (Pestel 1971: 12; 
Elichirigoity 1999: 81-84). After all, it was he who had invented and applied the rele-
vant systemic concepts. Writing down the WORLD-model presented the task of filling 
in values for the many variables of the model. This temporal order of the modeling 
procedure – first specify a set of interrelated variables and then fill in the empirical 
values – is characteristic of a theory-driven modeling approach. This has been pointed 
out by Evans in the case of economic modeling. Discussing the implications of the the-
ory-driven modeling-approach he writes: ”This is not to say that developing a macro-
economic model and using it to produce forecasts is a straightforward or easy task, but 
it is to say something about the sorts of problems that will be encountered. Principally, 
these will be technical problems caused by the limited amount of data available, the 
quality of these data, and so on.” (1997: 409) Such technical problems of how to inte-
grate data into the model also showed up in the debate over Limits to Growth. They 
crystallized in the statement that only 0.1 per cent of the data required to construct a 
satisfactory world model were available (Freeman 1973: 8). Both, the modelers and 
the critics agreed on that. They differed, however, on the relevance of this fact for the 
argumentative power of the model. In addition to the line of conflict presented above 
about who is to be held responsible for the simulation results, one finds diverging 
views on the consequences of this uncontested statement for modeling global issues: 
                                                                          
11
  The researchers from MIT present ‘System Dynamics’ as a ‘method’ as well as a ‘theory’ (38). 
12
  The very use of the name System Dynamics indicates that such an analysis cannot be characterized 
by a specific subject area. Systemic approaches claim to be general so that they can be adopted 
fruitfully in many subject areas. 
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What the Limits to Growth-
researchers write: 
”Questions of detail cannot be answered be-
cause the model simply does not yet contain 
much detail13. … In terms of exact predictions, 
the output is not meaningful. … The data we 
have to work with are certainly not sufficient 
for such forecasts, even if it were our purpose 
to make them. On the other hand it is vitally 
important to gain some understanding of the 
causes of … our socio-economic systems 
when the limits are reached.” (102) 
Detailed predictions cannot be made 
from a model that does not possess the 
respective level of descriptive detail. 
However, it is necessary to get a better 
understanding of current global devel-
opments. 
How then can the not so detailed 
model WORLD3 help to gain such in-
sights? 
”[E]ven in the absence of improved data, in-
formation now available is sufficient to gener-
ate valid basic behavior modes for the world 
system. This is true because the model’s feed-
back loop structure is a much more important 
determinant of overall behavior than the exact 
numbers used to quantify the feedback loops. 
Even rather large changes in input data do not 
generally alter the mode of behavior, as we 
shall see in the following pages. Numerical 
changes may well affect the period of an oscil-
lation or the rate of growth or the time of a 
collapse, but they will not affect the fact that 
the basic mode is oscillation or growth or col-
What critics write: 
”The notorious lack of data stood in the way 
of an empirically founded quantitative specifi-
cation of the relationships between variables.” 
(Harbordt 1972: 416)14 
”Deficiencies are understandable, considering 
the many difficulties that were in the way of 
the modeling process; to a certain degree, they 
were unavoidable. It is completely inexcusable 
though that the authors disregard one funda-
mental distinction: the distinction between 
statements about the model and its behavior 
and statements about the real system to be 
represented. Of course, you can experiment 
with a preliminary, deficient, not fully tested 
model, ‘just to see what happens’. However, 
you may not present these conclusions as 
statements about reality – and this is what the 
authors constantly do.” (Harbordt 1972: 
418)15 
There is not enough empirical data 
available to construct and thoroughly 
verify a model of the world. Therefore, 
the claim that the model is an adequate 
representation of the world cannot be 
justified. Results from simulation runs 
need to be treated and presented with 
caution and not as hard and fast facts 
about the real world. 
Is it possible to make informed 
guesses with a model that has not been 
validated empirically? 
”Whether or not economic growth will con-
tinue, and at what rate, depends on the rela-
                                                                          
13
  Note the ‘yet’ and other more explicit remarks on the same page, that promise: The future will 
see more detailed and precise models. 
14
  In the original: ”[Der notorische Datenmangel stand] einer empirisch begründeten quantitativen 
Spezifizierung der Variablenbeziehungen im Wege” 
15
  In the original: ”Angesichts der vielen Schwierigkeiten, die der Modellbildung im Wege standen, 
sind die genannten Mängel … verständlich; in einem gewissen Ausmaß waren sie unvermeidlich. 
Völlig unentschuldbar ist aber, daß die Verfasser eine grundlegende Unterscheidung mißachten: 
die Unterscheidung zwischen Aussagen über das Modell und dessen Verhalten und Aussagen über 
das abzubildende wirkliche System. Natürlich kann man auch mit einem vorläufigen, mangelhaf-
ten, ungenügend getesteten Modell experimentieren, ”um mal zu sehen, was herauskommt”. Nur 
darf man dann die daraus abgeleiteten Schlüsse nicht als Aussagen über die Wirklichkeit ausgeben 
– was die Autoren ständig tun.” 
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lapse.” (127) 
The exact values for the variables in 
the model do not affect the model’s ba-
sic behavior. Its behavior mode is 
dominated by the structure of the sys-
tem’s feedback loops. Analysis of this 
structure lays open the options for the 
future development of the system, be it 
dynamic stability or collapse. 
Summary: 
The available data and the model 
WORLD3 are not detailed enough to 
make accurate predictions. However, it 
is still valuable to examine a model of 
the world, since its structure – and not 
detailed numerical values – determines 
the possible behavior modes of the sys-
tem.  
tionship between the future rate of technical 
advance and that of the emergence of the 
problems to be met. The outcome is a question 
of a little more, a little less. No computer can 
aid us in making this forecast.” (Hagen 1972: 
14) 
Small errors in estimating the actual 
values of variables can cause relevant 
differences in the behavior of the sys-
tem. Reliable predictions about eco-
nomic systems are therefore impossible 
to make as long as detailed data are not 
available.  
Summary: 
Data of the necessary detail is not 
available to construct a valid model of 
global developments. This fact disquali-
fies all attempts to use a model to make 
forecasts since detailed empirical data 
decide future developments. 
 
Modelers as well as critics were aware of the fact that most of the data necessary to 
give the world model an empirically substantive grounding was inaccessible. Indeed, 
other modeling attempts show that collecting data as input for computer models can be 
a challenging task that involves major organizational efforts16. Laws need to be made 
to allow the collection of such data, institutions need to be installed to collect the data 
in an adequate form, salaries of the people working at these institutions need to be 
paid, etc. Having performed simulation runs with WORLD3, a model that could not be 
validated sufficiently with empirical data, the question needs to be addressed what 
consequences can be drawn from these computational results. Answers to this question 
diverged among debating scientists: 
The authors of Limits to Growth expect problems for the world system as it is ap-
proaching its limits. They aim to learn more about these limits with a model that relies 
on experts’ guesses rather than on measured values. According to them, this is feasible 
because there can be no doubt that the variables and relationships of WORLD3 are 
basic and essential ingredients of any world model. System Dynamics is a method that 
allows one to figure out the behavior modes that such a basic structure imposes on the 
evolution of a system. Working out the details can be left for future work. Replacing 
guessed values with measured quantities will not change those behavior modes, since 
they result from the structure of the system and not the inserted numerical values. 
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 Van den Bogaard (1999: 311ff) reports some of the institutional difficulties that were involved in 
collecting data to be fed into a model of the Dutch economy. 
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Other scientists do not take the System Dynamics approach and a clear-cut set of 
‘basic’ parameters for granted. They assume that there is not only one unique way of 
modeling the world. A modeling procedure does not necessarily start with the vari-
ables that the Limits to Growth-researchers call basic and it will not just refine the sta-
ble behavior mode dominated by the basic structure. Instead of accepting that the 
modeled variables and relationships dominate the overall behavior of the world system 
they call for an empirical verification of this claim. Furthermore they argue that small 
errors that enter the model through the informed guesses have the potential to funda-
mentally change future developments. Comprehensive and detailed data is therefore 
necessary for scientific modeling.  
4 The alignment of the conflict 
So far, two lines of conflict have been presented that separated debating scientists. 
They indicate yet another repetition of a constellation of controversy that Collins intro-
duced to science studies (see e.g. Collins 1983). In such a Collinsian controversy, a 
limited number of researchers, the so-called core-set, negotiates the received view in a 
scientific field by confronting incompatible experimental evidence. These researchers 
face the experimenter’s regress, i.e. the fact that an experiment in itself can never 
prove a theory right (or wrong) since the interpretation of experiments always relies on 
theoretically based expectations. This regress allows for individually consistent but 
mutually diverging views on the same scientific question. Since the opposing positions 
are equally possible explanations of the same question, eventually some social mecha-
nism has to come in to end debate and lead to the closure of the controversy. 
The controversy over Limits to Growth was different in various respects from such a 
Collinsian controversy. The least consequential difference seems to be the following: 
Whereas Collins is concerned ‘with controversies which involve experiment and ob-
servation’ (1981: 8) the Limits to Growth-study relies mainly on results from computer 
simulation. Even though one can argue – as has been done above – that computer 
simulation is also an experimental activity, it is obvious that Collins had empirical evi-
dence, traces of ‘nature’, in mind when he wrote about the necessity of experiment and 
observation. However, recent studies seem to indicate that strictly Collinsian contro-
versies over computer simulation (Evans 1997) and mathematics-based theorizing 
(Kennefick 2000) are also possible. It should be possible to extend Collins’ notion of 
controversy beyond the realm of the strictly empirical to activities that involve the in-
terpretation of observations, regardless of whether the observed is ‘nature’. 
A far more serious deviation of the debate over Limits to Growth from a Collinsian 
style controversy becomes visible if one takes a closer look at the notion of core-set: 
According to Collins, the core-set includes all scientists ‘who are actively involved in 
experimentation or observation, or making contributions to the theory of the phenome-
non, or of the experiment, such that they have an effect on the outcome of the contro-
versy.’ (1981: 8) He further elaborates that both active involvement and having an ef-
fect are necessary preconditions to make a scientist an element of the core-set (1981: 
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8, footnote 8). In the controversy over Limits to Growth, the core-set, as Collins de-
fines it, would consist of the research team at MIT (Meadows et al. 1972) and the re-
search team from Sussex, England, that set out to analyze the simulation study in depth 
some time after MIT’s study had been published (Cole et al. (ed.) 1973). These were 
the only parties that had conducted research specifically to answer the question of 
whether it is feasible to make statements on the future dynamics of the world using a 
computer model and whether the predictions made in Limits to Growth are sound17. 
Where critical comments on Limits to Growth were commonplace, original research to 
check the promoted results was rare. Since the research-group from Sussex took action 
only after Limits to Growth had been out and since they published their results only in 
1973, early in the debate, Gabor could make the following point: 
“The rational way of rejecting [Forrester’s work] would be to show that it is so critically dependent 
on the model, and on the policies which are fed into it, that its predictive value is nil or less than that 
of intuitive forecasts. To my knowledge this has never been attempted, by any of the critics. Instead 
they reject it out of hand, intuitively, with angry aspersions at the author and the Club of Rome.” 
(1972: 109) 
In fact, the majority of scientists who wrote about the results presented in Limits to 
Growth, had not done any research to give different and conflicting answers to the 
questions raised in Limits to Growth. For most of them, it was neither viable nor desir-
able to attempt something comparable to the simulation study. The research project 
had sought to answer questions that many other scientists did not consider answerable. 
Following the above definition of the core-set, most discussants would have to be ig-
nored in a sociological reconstruction of the controversy. Since those researchers, who 
are not elements of the core-set, did have a strong impact on the scientific controversy 
over Limits to Growth, it will not be pictured as a Collinsian controversy. Rather, the 
debate suggests a different descriptive vocabulary. In this case, it is more helpful to 
say that the results presented in Limits to Growth were perceived by social scientists 
as an intrusion into the domain of expertise that was occupied by social science. This 
intrusion forced social scientists to react in one way or the other. In the following I will 
describe social scientists’ reaction to the intrusion of the System Dynamics research-
ers. The terminology of ‘intrusion’ is adequate to describe the debate around Limits to 
Growth because it emphasizes two important aspects: 
First, the intruders were perceived as being different and using different methods 
from what was conventional in the social sciences. Researchers and methods came 
from a technical background that had no reputation of having worked successfully on 
topics of social sciences before. From the point of view of social scientists these scien-
tists applied ‘electrical engineering and servomechanism principles to social systems’ 
(Shubik 1971: 1014). Additionally, social scientists claimed that the simulation study 
neglected the current state of the art in the social sciences and drew its inspiration ex-
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  Bloomfield (1985), who studies controversy in the context of the Limits to Growth-debate, turns 
to a conflict between exactly these parties. 
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clusively from the methods that Forrester had brought from MIT’s servomechanisms 
laboratory. As Shubik continues to complain: 
”The application of careful dimensional analysis and the specification of good measures in the right 
dimensions are all difficult and critical. For instance, what is a measure of ‘welfare’? Even given a 
measure, what is its operational significance? Answers to questions such as these call for an intimate 
knowledge of subjects such as economics, sociology, psychology, and political science. Why are so 
few social scientists referred to by Forrester? Are there none whose knowledge is worth considering 
when building models of social, political, economic processes?” (1972: 110) 
Second, the intruders came equipped with means that made them confident that they 
had a superior grasp of the matters in question. Here, computer simulation plays a 
leading role in the debate. These superior means consisted of computer simulation as 
the crucial element to enable the intruders to study global issues. As has been dis-
cussed above, the reasons for this claim were twofold: (I) Computer models were sup-
posed to be clearer, more comprehensive, and more exact than mental models. 
(II) System Dynamics could do what other methods could not do: make valuable fore-
casts on behavior modes even in the absence of detailed quantitative data. 
Technical researchers intruded the field of social science with the help of computer 
models. They presented themselves as using methods that were different from and su-
perior to those of social scientists. How can social scientists react to such an intrusion? 
Various options are possible: indifference, incorporation, or repulsion of the intrusion. 
I will discuss these options in turn: 
First they might deem it unnecessary to react visibly at all. Total indifference to the 
claims made in Limits to Growth would be a way of maintaining that there is simply no 
point in taking those statements seriously. The methods as well as the conclusions 
would be portrayed as utterly beyond reason, the mistaken opinion of a marginal mi-
nority. However, there was one strong reason why indifference was hardly a feasible 
option for social scientists in the case of Limits to Growth: Its immense success in the 
public media. Discussions about the looming collapse of modern society had become 
commonplace in the wake of Limits to Growth18. If the public takes statements seri-
ously that suggest that there is a way to find out about global issues that is different 
and superior to conventional approaches in the social sciences, then social scientists 
have every reason to get involved in the debate. Otherwise they run the risk of losing 
scientific authority19. 
The other possible reactions to the results of Limits to Growth urge social scientists 
to engage in the discussion of the simulation study. Attending to the immense publicity 
                                                                          
18
  Harbordt (1972: 421, Fn. 21) gives some examples how the statements from Limits to Growth 
were used in political, economic, and even theological arguments. A quick look at the headlines of 
leading newspapers at the time reaffirms the impression that a major public debate was taking pla-
ce. 
19
  Similarly, Collins and Pinch (1982: 41-43) were surprised by the vigor with which paranormal 
work was attacked by academic researchers. They argue that the positive motivation of getting 
public attention was the main reason for scientists to spend resources on arguing against the re-
sults from parascientific. 
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of Limits to Growth and using the publicity for the purposes of the social sciences 
could lead either to an incorporation or rejection of its conclusions and methods.  
Incorporation would imply that social scientists and the System Dynamics research-
ers understand themselves as having common scientific interests and as applying mu-
tually benefiting knowledge. Social scientists could have made the System Dynamics 
researchers a part of their own scientific endeavor and supplemented their conven-
tional approaches with the technique of computer modeling. Latour (1988a: 59ff) at-
tributes the continuing success of Louis Pasteur to the successful application of exactly 
this kind of interaction of actors. When Pasteur ‘rushed into previous bodies of knowl-
edge’, i.e. when he intruded into the field of e.g. public hygiene, he kept his ‘labora-
tory practices that were different enough to render irrelevant the colleagues who were 
already engaged in those disciplines.’ (Latour 1988a: 69) According to Latour, the 
crucial element in Pasteur’s amazing success story is to having found allies that would 
support him. He ‘imposed on them a way of formulating [a] demand to which only he 
possessed the answer’ (Latour 1988a: 71), and thereby turned hygienists into Pasteuri-
ans. Pasteur was perceived as a substantial help for hygienists, as their ‘advocate’. In 
the case of the debate over Limits to Growth social scientists reacted mainly critically 
and did not perceive the System Dynamics researchers as their advocates20.  
In the case of Limits to Growth, intrusion into the domain of social science expertise 
was mainly counteracted by repulsion. The institutionalized experts on questions of 
global economic, political, and social evolution did not let computer modelers get 
away with claiming competence on these topics without paying attention to the social 
sciences. Social scientists defended their field by arguing against the claims of the 
computer modelers, that System Dynamics is (I) no more convincing than traditional 
approaches in the social sciences. The use of computer simulation does not free re-
search of value-based judgements since it is the underlying assumptions of the model 
that are crucial, just as in the more traditional mental models. Furthermore, social sci-
entists explained why System Dynamics is actually (II) less convincing than traditional 
approaches in the social sciences, because the choice of the model characteristics can-
not be justified by empirical verifications. The kind of detailed data that is crucial for a 
reliable understanding of long-term processes, is simply not available. 
5 Conclusion 
This study is an invitation to reconsider the debate over Limits to Growth as a case 
where one can learn about how computer simulation is situated in scientific discourse. 
The controversy exemplifies one strategy regarding how to deal with an intrusion into 
a field of disciplinary expertise: repulsion rather than indifference or incorporation. 
Computer simulation plays a prominent role in the debate by providing the intruders 
with visibly different and presumably powerful means to make the intrusion potentially 
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 Alternative positions were formulated in letters to editors of scientific journals, e.g. Gabor (1972); 
Hardin (1972); Hemond et al. (1972). Limits to Growth became the advocate not of a scientific 
field but of a political movement – environmentalism. 
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successful. Therefore, it is not surprising that computer simulation became one of the 
main topics of the debate. Undermining the believability of computer simulation would 
have been equal to a successful repulsion of the intruders. The two main points of dis-
cussion for technical and social scientists concerned the questions where responsibility 
for the simulation results were to be found and what importance detailed data had for 
the validity of the model. 
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